This paper investigates the linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) mean-field game (MFG) for a class of stochastic delay systems. We consider a large population system in which the dynamics of each player satisfies some forward stochastic differential delay equation (SDDE). The consistency condition or Nash certainty equivalence (NCE) principle is established through an auxiliary mean-field system of anticipated forward-backward stochastic differential equation with delay (AFBSDDE). The wellposedness of such consistency condition system can be further established by some continuation method instead the classical fixed-point analysis. Thus, the consistency condition maybe given on arbitrary time horizon. The decentralized strategies are derived which are shown to satisfy the ǫ-Nash equilibrium property. Two special cases of our MFG for delayed system are further investigated.
Introduction
Recently, within the context of noncooperative game theory, the dynamic optimization of stochastic large-population system has attracted consistent and intense research attentions through a variety of fields including management science, engineering, mathematical finance and economics, social science, etc. The most special feature of controlled large-population system lies in the existence of considerable insignificant agents whose dynamics and (or) cost functionals are coupled via the state-average across the whole population. To design low-complexity strategies, one efficient methodology is the mean-field game (MFG) theory which enable us to obtain the decentralized control based on the individual own state together with some off-line quantity. The interested readers may refer [10, 17] for the motivation and methodology, and [1, [4] [5] [6] for recent progress in mean-field game theory. Besides, some other recent literature include [2, 3, [13] [14] [15] 18] for linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) mean-field games of large-population system.
It is remarkable that all agents in above literature are comparably negligible in that they are not able to affect the whole population in separable manner. By contrast, their impacts are imposed in an unified manner through the population state-average. In this sense, all agents can be viewed as negligible peers but they can generate some mass effects via some "unified manner" such as the control (input)-average or state (output)-average. These averages represent some type of impact imposed to other peers.
We point out in above works, all agents' states are formulated by (forward) stochastic differential equations (SDEs) with the initial conditions as a priori. As a sequel, the agents' objectives are minimizations of cost functionals involving their terminal states. In some realistic situation, there exist some phenomena in which the state behavior depends not only on the situation at time t, but also on a finite lagged state at t − θ. Moreover, if we use the information which we know to anticipate the future evolution, we can get better results. As the novelty, this paper turns to consider the delay framework in which the agents' dynamics is characterized by some (forward) stochastic differential equations with delay (SDDEs). It means that the impacts are hardly imposed to each agent immediately. A new type of BSDEs called anticipated BSDEs (ABSDEs) was introduced in [20] , which type of BSDEs can be applied to many fields such as optimal control and finance. Based on it, the problems which depend not only the present but also the history were solved by [7] . In the consequent works, the FBSDEs with delay and related LQ problems were studied in [8] and [9] . A kind of stochastic maximum principle for optimal control problems of delay systems involving continuous and impulse controls was considered in [24] . The forward-backward linear quadratic stochastic optimal control problem with delay was investigated in [11] . And the maximum principle for optimal control of fully coupled forward stochastic differential delayed equations was derived in [12] . Moreover, some other important phenomena with delay were under consideration in [25, 26] .
To formulate the above problem mathematically, some SDDE should be introduced to characterize the dynamics of the agents. It is remarkable that there exist rich literature concerning the theories and applications of SDDE. Generally, the large population problem with delay is under consideration. We discuss the related mean-field LQG games and derive the decentralized strategies. A stochastic process which relates to the delay term of control is introduced here to be the approximation of the control-average process. An auxiliary mean-field SDDE and a AFBSDDE system are considered and analyzed. Here, the AFBSDDE, which is composed by a SDDE and a ABSDE. Further, the AFBSDDE can be divided into two simple AFBSDDEs. In addition, the limit process is related to the wellposedness of a anticipated forward-backward ordinary differential equation with delay (AFBODDE) and a AFBSDDE. We also derive the ǫ-Nash equilibrium property of decentralized control strategy with ǫ = O(1/ √ N ). The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates the large population LQG games of forward systems with delay. In Section 3, we derive the limiting optimal controls of the track systems and the consistency conditions. Section 4 is devoted to the related ǫ-Nash equilibrium property. Section 5 gives two special cases in this work.
Problem formulation
(Ω, F, P ) is a complete probability space on which a standard (d+m×N )-dimensional Brownian
Here, {F W 0 t } 0≤t≤T stands for the common information of all players; while {F i t } 0≤t≤T is the individual information of i th player. Throughout this paper, R n denotes the n-dimensional Euclidean space, its usual norm | · | and the usual inner product ·, · . For a given vector or matrix M , M ⊤ stands for its transpose.
Moreover, we denote the spaces of matrices as follows.
• S d : the space of all d × d symmetric matrices.
• S d + : the subspace of all positive semi-definite matrices of S d .
•Ŝ d + : the subspace of all positive definite matrices of S d . For any Euclidean space R n , we introduce the following notations:
is an R n -valued uniformly bounded function}.
•
In this paper, we consider a large population system with N individual agents, denoted by {A i } 1≤i≤N . The dynamics of A i satisfies the following controlled stochastic differential equation with delay (SDDE):
where a is the initial state of A i , x i t−δ denotes the individual state delay, u i t−θ denotes the individual input or control delay. In addition,
t−θ is introduced to denote the input delay of all other agents, imposed on a given agent A i . Similar state delay can be found in [22] . Here, for simplicity, we assume all agents are statistically identical (homogeneous) in that they share the same coefficients (A, A, B, B, B, σ, σ 0 ) and deterministic initial state a. The admissible control strategy u i ∈ U i , where
Considering the state and control delay, the cost functional for A i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N is given by
where
For the coefficients of (1) and (2), we set the following assumption:
Now, we formulate the large population dynamic optimization problem with delay.
Problem (LD). Find a control strategies setū = (ū 1 , · · · ,ū N ) which satisfies
3 The limiting optimal control and Nash certainty equivalence (NCE) equation system
To study Problem (LD), an efficient approach is to discuss the associated mean-field games by analyzing the asymptotic behavior when the agent number N tends to infinity. The key ingredient in this approach is to specify some suitable representation of state-average limit. With the help of such limit representation, we can figure out some auxiliary or tracking problem parameterized by the state-average limit. Based on it, the decentralized strategies of individual agents can thus be derived and we can also determine the state-average limit via some consistency condition. Moreover, the approximate Nash equilibrium property can be verified. Noting that the agents are homogeneous, thus the optimal controls of A i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N are conditionally independent with identical distribution. Suppose
Introducing the following auxiliary dynamics of the players,
The associated limiting cost functional becomes
Thus, we formulate the limiting LQG game with delay (LLD) as follows.
Problem (LLD).
To find an admissible controlū i ∈ U i for i th agent A i satisfying
Such an admissible controlū i is called an optimal control, andx i (·) = x iū (·) is called the corresponding optimal trajectory. We link the Problem (LLD) to a stochastic Hamiltonian system as follows, which is an anticipated stochastic algebra differential equation system with delay,
To get the optimal control of Problem (LLD), we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1 Let (H1)-(H2) hold. The sufficient and necessary condition for the optimal control of A i for (LLD) is that u i t has the following form
Moreover, for any given
Proof The sufficient and necessary condition part could be from some variational calculus and dual representation, which is a straightforward consequence of the stochastic maximum principle in Yu [24] . We omit the proof. Moreover, under assumption (H2), by the form of (7), our problem is to solve the following fully-coupled AFBSDDE,
Applying the classic "continuation method" which was proposed in [16] , [21] , the proof is similar as in the Appendix of [9] , the above linear AFBSDDE (8) has a unique solution. So the Hamiltonian system (6) admits a unique solution.
For the further studying, consider the following two AFBSDDEs which are fully-coupled in states,
and
and it is of the following form,
where y 1 t is the solution of (11) and y 2 t is the solution of (12)
Proof It follows from (9) and (10) that y j,1 t is independent of W 0 t , y 2 t is independent of W j t , for 1 ≤ j ≤ N , respectively. Thus, we have
By virtue of Lemma 3.1, we obtain
Here, Σ θ
t ] , which is the deterministic function;
t , for i = j, i, j = 1, 2, · · · , N , so Ey i,1 t is independent on i, then we denote Ey i,1 t = Ey 1 t , where y 1 t is the solution of (11). Thus Σ θ 1 (t) can be rewritten as
Hence the result. (11)- (12) are called the Nash certainty equivalence (NCE) equation system which can be used to determine the control state-average limit m 0 (t). Note that m 0 (t) plays an important role due to the dependence of decentralized strategyū i (t) on it. We can see thatū i t in (7) is dependent on the solutionȳ i t andȳ i t+θ of (6), andȳ i t ,ȳ i t+θ are dependent on m 0 (t).
Remark 3.1 In what follows

ǫ-Nash equilibrium analysis
In above sections, we obtained the optimal controlū i t , 1 ≤ i ≤ N of Problem (LLD) through the consistency condition system. Now, we turn to verify the ǫ-Nash equilibrium of Problem (LD). To start, we first present the definition of ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
for N agents is called to satisfy an ǫ-Nash equilibrium with respect to the costs J i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N, if there exists ǫ ≥ 0 such that for any fixed
when any alternative control u i ∈ U i is applied by A i .
Remark 4.1 If ǫ = 0, then Definition 4.1 is reduced to the usual Nash equilibrium. Now, we state the main result of this paper and its proof will be given later.
satisfies the ǫ-Nash equilibrium of (LD). Here, for 1 ≤ i ≤ N,ū i t is given by (7).
The proof of Theorem 4.1 needs several lemmas which are presented later. Denotingx i t is the centralized state trajectory with respect toū i t ;x i t is the decentralized one with respect toū i t . The cost functionals for (LD) and (LLD) are denoted by J i (ū i t ,ū −i t ) and J i (ū i t ), respectively.
whereū j t is given by (7).
Proof. By (7), (13) and Lemma 3.1, we get
Combining (17) and (14), we obtain
Then it follows from (H1) that
where C 1 is a positive constant. Recall (9) 
t is independent of y k,1 t , for j = k, and we have
Proof. For ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ N , by (1) and (3), we have
Taking integral from 0 to T , we geť
By Lemma 4.1, (H1) and Gronwall's inequality, (19) is obtained.
In addition,
Then we get (20) .
Proof. For ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ N, it is easy to see sup
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and (19), we have
Similarly, (22) is obtained. Then noting (H2), we have
which implies (23) . Here, C 2 is a positive constant. Until now, we have addressed some estimates of states and costs corresponding to controlū i t , 1 ≤ i ≤ N . Next we will focus on the ǫ-Nash equilibrium for (LD). For any fixed i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , consider a alternative control u i t ∈ U i for A i and introduce the dynamics
whereas other players keep the controlū
The dynamics of A i with respect to u i t for (LLD) is    dp
We have the following lemma.
Proof of Theorem 4.1: Now, we consider the ǫ-Nash equilibrium for A i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N . It follows from (23) and (30) that
Thus, Theorem 4.1 follows by taking ǫ = O 1 √ N .
Special cases
In this section, we will study some special cases to show the essence of MFG problem with delay.
Case I: In this case, we will give the "closed-loop" form of the ǫ-Nash equilibrium. For simplicity, let A t = B t = 0 in system (1), then we study the following system,
and the cost functional is still (2) . Now, we consider the following FBSDE
In system (32), we could deduce the m θ 0 (t) as follows,
whereỹ t satisfies the following FBSDDE,
where W t and W i t are independent and identically distributed. According to the Appendix in [9] , (33) has a unique solution (x t ,ỹ t ,z t ,z 0 t ). Then, FBSDDE (32) could be rewritten as follows We obtain the optimal feedback is u i t = −(N t + N t+θ ) −1 B ⊤ t (P tx i t + φ t ). From Theorem 4.1, we claim that (ū 1 t ,ū 2 t , · · · ,ū N t ) is the ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the Problem (31), (2).
Case II: Now, we consider another special case. Let A t = B t = 0 in system (1), moreover, we assume δ = θ, then we study the following system        So the ǫ-Nash equilibrium is (ū 1 t ,ū 2 t , · · · ,ū N t ). Next, we consider a special case that the coefficients are all constants: A t = A, B t = B, M = 1, N t = N , N t = N , then the solution of (37) as follows, 
